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Contract Interference by Previous Employer

W

Robert I. Bendis*

employed by the Storz
Broadcasting Company. The contract of employment between
Bennett and the Broadcasting Company contained a restrictive covenant
that prohibited him, upon termination of his employment, from accepting
employment with any other station within a radius of thirty-five miles
of any Storz station for a period of eighteen months.
His employment with Storz having terminated, Bennett was about to
take a position with another station when his former employer wrote a
letter to his prospective new employer which read, in part,
...We are authorized to advise you that if there is any violation of
the contract referred to on the part of Mr. Bennett that we will be
instructed to institute appropriate legal proceedings .... 1
Bennett brought an action against his former employer, alleging that this
letter prevented his being hired and constituted an act of tortious interference. Whether or not Bennett was correct in his allegation and
whether or not his former employer was justified in its act were the
questions presented to the court in the case of William Bennett v. Storz
2
Broadcasting Company.
The answers to these questions turned on the court's interpretation
of the following issues: what acts constitute actionable interference; was
the contract of employment between the plaintiff and the defendant,
and/or the negative covenant contained therein, valid; was the existence
of a contract crucial or even necessary for an action to lie; could there
be any justification for the defendant's acts; and lastly, could the court
award a summary judgment in such a case or must the case be decided
on its facts as determined by a jury?
These questions and their answers also constitute the basic issues of
this topic-interference by a previous employer.
ILLIAM BENNETT WAS A RADIO ANNOUNCER

The Requisites of Tort
It is a basic principle of all torts that one owes another a duty to
avoid the negligent or willful doing of an act which will result in damage
or injury to the other, unless some legal justification exists excusing that
act.3 Not only must there be a legal duty owed by the actor but there
must also exist in the injured party a corresponding legal right which
Western Reserve Univ.; J.D. (June, 1967), Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
270 Minn. 525, 134 N.W.2nd 892 (1965).
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'

2 Ibid.
3 Macrum v. Security Trust & Savings Co., 221 Ala. 419, 129 So. 74 (1930).
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was affected by the conduct complained of.4 Going a step further, having
established a duty in the actor and a right in the injured party (i.e., a
legal relationship), still, if the conduct of the actor is to constitute a tort,
a wrong must have been committed, either as a breach of that duty or a
violation of that right.5
The mere fact that one party has suffered a loss as the result of the6
conduct of another is not sufficient, standing alone, to constitute a tort.
7
If all other requisites are not met, it is merely damnum absque injuria.
By the same token, if all requisites are met, the complete absence of any
8
legal injury destroys the possibility of the existence of a tort.

The intentional doing of some injurious act without legal justification is termed legal malice, 9 and is not to be confused with malice in the
sense of hatred or spite which is generally material only as it affects the
issue of punitive damages.' 0
The Tort of Malicious Interference
The tort of interference is any intentional act that constitutes an
invasion of another's property, property rights or personal rights, causing
an injury without just cause, privilege or excuse."
It has often been held that the right to pursue one's business, calling,
trade or occupation is deemed a property right which the law will pro2
tect against any wrongful or unjustified and malicious interference.1
Such malicious interference with a person's right to pursue a lawful
13
business or occupation has been held to constitute an actionable tort.
Similarly considered as a property right is a person's right to make
a contract, whether of employment or otherwise. Any act of malicious
interference which results in either the breach of a contract or in the
preventing of the making of a contract, when done otherwise than in the
legitimate exercise of the actor's own rights, or without justification, and
Bennett v. Illinois Power & Light Corp., 355 Ill. 564, 189 N.E. 899 (1934); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Tye, 295 Ky. 697, 175 S.W.2d 366 (1943).
5 Smith v. Okerson, 8 N.J. Super. 560, 73 A.2d 857 (1950); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Tye, supra note 4; Hilleary v. Bromley, 146 Ohio St. 212, 64 N.E.2d 832 (1946); Bennett v. Illinois Power & Light Corp., supra note 4.
6 Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 171 Minn. 260, 214 N.W. 754 (1927).
7 Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 58 S.Ct. 300 (App. D.C. 1937).
8 Mike v. Lian, 322 Pa. 353, 185 A. 775 (1936).
4

9 Reichman v. Drake, 89 Ohio App. 222, 100 N.E.2d 533 (1951).
10

Ibid.

11 Reichman v. Drake, supra note 9; Soucy v. Wysocki, 139 Conn. 622, 96 A.2d 225
(1953).
12 Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., Inc., 243 Ala. 600, 11 So.2d 383, (1943); National Life
& Acc. Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 162 Okla. 174, 21 P.2d 492 (1933).
13 Leibovitz v. Central National Bank, 75 Ohio App. 25, 60 N.E.2d 727 (1944); Owen
v. Williams, 322 Mass. 356, 77 N.E.2d 318, (1948); Voltube Corp. v. B. & C. Insulation
Products, Inc., 20 N.J. Super. 250, 89 A.2d 713 (1951).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol17/iss1/18

2

INTERFERENCE BY PREVIOUS EMPLOYER

with the intent of injuring another or benefiting at another's expense, is
14
also deemed tortious and constitutes an actionable wrong.
Even though the existence of a contract is not essential to the existence of a tort,15 interference with a contract or with the right to contract
is a tort, where the evidence establishes sufficiently that, but for such
interference, the contract would have been made or carried out.16 It has
been held that a mere showing by the injured party of an intentional
interference with his contract rights is sufficient to establish a prima facie
case, upon which it becomes incumbent on the actor to show legal justifi17
cation for his acts.
As regards employment, an act on the part of a previous employer
with the intent to cause injury by preventing future employment constitutes malicious interference. This is also the very essence of the actionable offense of blacklisting.' 8 But blacklisting, like other acts of interference, is not a wrong unless actual damages occur. 19
Thus it would seem from the discussion above that the law governing the tort of interference is clear cut and easily applied. But law is
applied to facts, and facts vary. Law, likewise, is subject to interpretation. Many questions remain unanswered. Specifically, what acts by a
previous employer which cause injury to the future business or employment of a former employee constitute actionable malicious interference?
What effect, if any, does the existence of a contract of employment containing a negative covenant, restraining the former employee after termination of employment, have on the former employer's acts? Under
what conditions may a previous employer's acts, which would otherwise
be tortious, be so legally justified as to relieve or excuse him from
liability?
Acts of Interference by a Previous Employer
Once a plaintiff has sufficiently established a prima facie case of
malicious interference by the defendant, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce such evidence as will show a legal justification for his acts
so as to relieve himself of liability. 20 Whether or not the defendant successfully establishes such a legal justification is a question of fact for a
14 Coleman v. Whisnant, 225 N.C. 494, 35 S.E.2d 647 (1945); Reichman v. Drake,
supra note 9.
15 Peru Heating Co. v. Lenhart, 48 Ind. App. 319, 95 N.E. 680 (1911); Owen v. Williams, supra note 13.
16 Leibovitz v. Central National Bank, supra note 13; Paul's Drugs, Inc. v. Southern
Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 175 So.2d 203 (D. Ct. App., Fla., 1965).
17 Owen v. Williams, supra note 13; Wilkinson v. Powe, 300 Mich. 275, 1 N.W.2d 539
(1942); Reeves v. Scott, 324 Mass. 594, 87 N.E.2d 833 (1949).
18 Johnson v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., Inc., 128 Ore. 121, 270 P. 772 (1928).
19 Willner v. Silverman, 109 Md. 341, 71 A. 962 (1909).
20 Owen v. Williams, supra note 13; Wilkinson v. Powe, supra note 17; Reeves v.
Scott, supra note 17.
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jury to determine. 21 (The questions of circumstances and tests applied to
determine the existence of a justification are discussed below.)
Similarly, the plaintiff's attempt to establish a prima facie case revolves around the facts. A few examples will illustrate the variety of
situations with which the courts have had to deal.
In one case the plaintiff had been employed by the defendant for
eleven years, doing freight claim work. He had become an expert in the
field and had made many friends among the freight claim agents of various carriers. He developed an enmity with certain officers and agents of
the defendant, resulting from his discovery that they were "mulcting"
certain railroads and from his efforts to collect a claim against a steamship company in which the defendant owned stock. He was systematically demoted several times and finally discharged, after which the defendant sent 128 letters, mostly to carrier representatives, which stated
that the plaintiff was no longer in the defendant's employ. The plaintiff
alleged that as a result of the defendant's acts he had been prevented
from earning a living and that the letters caused his former friends in
official positions to shun him. He claimed that these acts were committed
as part of a malicious and continuing plan. The court held that the acts
constituted a malicious interference with the plaintiff's right to earn a
living.

22

In another action the defendant, a hospital physician, claimed that
the plaintiff, a graduate nurse, had disparaged him to his patients. The
plaintiff denied these statements. Nevertheless, the defendant excluded
her from nursing at the hospital by threatening not to send any more
patients there. Here the court felt that the plaintiff's inability to obtain
employment at any hospital in good standing resulted from the defendant's interference with her employment and held the defendant liable.2
Compare the above cases with Wabash R. Co. v. Young, 24 in which
the defendant railroad prevented the plaintiff from being employed by
another railroad by stating to the other railroad that the plaintiff was a
labor agitator. Here it was held that the defendant's act did not constitute a malicious interference with the plaintiff's business.
In Martin v. Southern Wheel Co.,25 defendant discharged plaintiff,
telling him that he would never get work anywhere as long as he (defendant) could prevent it. Plaintiff brought this action after having unsuccessfully tried to obtain employment for about ten months. It was the
21 Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., supra note 1; Owen v. Williams, supra note 13.

22 Ledwith v. International Paper Co., 64 N.Y.S.2d 810 (1946), 66 N.Y.S.2d 625, aft'd
without op. 271 App. Div. 864 (1946), 67 N.Y.S.2d 688, leave to app. den. 271 App.
Div. 916 (1947).
23 Owen v. Williams, supra note 13.

24 162 Ind. 102, 69 N.E. 1003 (1904).
25 32 Ga. App. 477, 123 SXE. 912 (1924).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol17/iss1/18

4

INTERFERENCE BY PREVIOUS EMPLOYER

court's opinion that these facts were not sufficient to permit a finding of
interference with the plaintiff's right to employment.
Legal authority, as sketched above, indicates that as to the question,
"what acts constitute malicious interference?", the law is the same
whether the actor be the injured party's previous employer or any other
third party interfering with the rights of the injured party. The statement that one may not interfere with another's rights applies to both.
Only the peculiar relationship of employer-employee provides justifications unique because of that relationship.
Legal Justification, Excuse, or Privilege
. . . The courts have not attempted to formulate a rule by which

justification or lack of justification may be determined, but have said
that in general the issue is largely one of fact for the jury; the standard being reasonable conduct under all the circumstances of the
case .... 26
situThus it is held that under certain circumstances and in certain 27
ations one's acts, otherwise tortious, may be justified or privileged.
In Standard Oil Co. v. Bertelsen the court said:
...A man's right to labor in any occupation, in which he is fit to
engage is a valuable right which should not be taken from him, or
limited.

....

28

But even after making so unqualified a statement, the court went on to
say that there were cases where this principle may be superseded by considerations of justice or necessity.2 9
One ordinarily has a right to be secure in the contracts he makes
and to be allowed to pursue his business or employment free from the
interference of others, except in a case where such others are30 acting in
pursuance of a superior or at least equal but conflicting right.
If a defendant can show that his interference with the plaintiff's
employment was justified by some legal object which he had a right to
assert, he may avoid liability for his acts.3' Thus, if acts which are ordinarily tortious are to be justified, the defendant must show that he sought
to acquire some legitimate, direct and immediate benefit to himself by so
26 Carnes v. St. Paul Union Stockyard Co., 164 Minn. 457, 205 N.W. 630, 632, Note, 10
Minn. L. Rev. 448 (1925).
27 Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal.2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941).
28 186 Minn. 483, 487, 243 N.W. 701, 703 (1932).

n Ibid.
30 Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., supra note 1; Roraback v. Motion Picture Ma-

chine Operators' Union of Minneapolis, 140 Minn. 481, 168 N.W. 766, 3 A.L.R. 1290
(1918); Jensen v. Lundorff, 258 Minn. 275, 103 N.W.2d 887 (1960); National Life &
Accident Ins. Co. v. Wallace, supra note 12; Owens v. Automotive Engineers, Inc., 208
Okla. 251, 255 P.2d 240 (1953).
31 Roraback v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union of Minneapolis, supra note
30; Owens v. Automotive Engineers, Inc., supra note 30.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1968

5

17 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)

Jan., 1968

acting. 32 The true purpose for invading another's rights must be the bettering of one's own lawful business, rather than the destroying of another's employment or business. 33
An employer, like an employee, also has a property right in his
business, and if he is acting to protect his own rights, he is privileged to
interfere, 34 so long as the means he uses are proper and legal. 35
In the strictest sense, when an act of interference is justified and the
means used are lawful, no tort has been committed.3 6
In any event, the burden of proving a justification for interference
the court will view
with someone's employment is on the interferor,3 and
7
party.
other
the
for
favorably
the evidence most
Effect of Negative Covenants in Contracts of Employment
An employment contract containing a covenant restricting an employee's right to work or to exercise his right to gainful employment
after termination of employment is in at least partial restraint of trade,
is looked upon by the courts with disfavor, and is strictly interpreted by
them.38

Such covenants will be held valid, however, if entered into for the
honest purpose of protecting a legitimate interest of the party in whose
favor they are imposed, if reasonable between the parties, and if not
injurious to the interests of the public. 39 Such factors as the following
are considered in determining validity: 1) The necessity of restraint for
the protection of the business or good will of the employer, 2) regard for
the nature of the employment, 3) The length of time for which it is imposed, 4) the territorial extent of the restriction, 5) the rights of the emtalents, and
ployee to work and earn a livelihood within the limits of his
40
6) regard for the protection of the interests of the public.
Thus, the validity of such covenants is determined in each particular
case on its own facts, taking into consideration the subject matter, the
nature of the business, the situation of the parties, and the circumstances
Fashioncraft, Inc. v. Halpern, 313 Mass. 385, 48 N.E.2d 1 (1943).
National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Wallace, supra note 12; Bennett v. Storz
Broadcasting Co., supra note 1.
34 Owens v. Automotive Engineers, Inc., supra note 30; Petit v. Cuneo, 290 Ill. App.
16, 7 N.E.2d 774 (1937).
35 Petit v. Cuneo, supra note 34.
36 Alfred W. Booth & Bro. v. Burgess, 72 N.J.Eq. 181, 65 A. 226 (1906); Owens v.
Automotive Engineers, Inc., supra note 30.
37 Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., supra note 1.
38 Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., supra note 1; Arthur Murray Dance Studios of
Cleveland v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d 685 (1952); Extine v. Williamson
Midwest, Inc., 176 Ohio St. 403, 200 N.E.2d 297 (1964).
39 Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., supra note 1; Arthur Murray Dance Studios of
Cleveland v. Witter, supra note 38; Gates-McDonald Co. v. McQuilkin, 33 Ohio L.
Abs. 481, 34 N.E.2d 443 (1941).
40 Ibid.
32
33
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of the particular case. But where the facts show that the restraint on the
employee is greater than is necessary to protect the interests of the employer, or that the restraint imposes undue or oppressive hardship on the
employee, or that the restraint will interfere with public interests, such
41
restraint will be held invalid, unreasonable, and unenforceable.
The court upheld such a covenant in Briggs v. Butler,42 in which the
plaintiff had brought an action to restrain the defendant, Butler, from
violating the terms of a contract of employment between them. The restrictive covenant in this contract had provided that the defendant would
not engage in the advertising business in competition with the plaintiff
in Toledo, Ohio, or in any city in the United States or Canada where the
plaintiff did business, for a period of five years following the termination
of her employment. The court felt that this restraint was valid as it met
the tests and was reasonable as to time and space.
But a similar agreement, in Gates-McDonald Co. v. McQuilkin,43
was held by the court to be an unreasonable restraint of trade, because
it restricted the employee in the exercise of a gainful occupation. Here,
the defendant had covenanted not to work for anyone, anywhere in the
State of Ohio, in the area of workmen's compensation insurance, for a
period of three years following the termination of his employment. Six
weeks after he had been fired, the defendant opened his own service to
employers, soliciting the plaintiff's clients, and was working for at least
two of them. The plaintiff's attempt to restrain him was unsuccessful.
The factual nature of the questions discussed in this section was
illustrated in William Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Company,44 when
the court refused the defendant's motion for a summary judgment, deciding that the issue, whether the restrictive covenant justified the defendant's acts, was a question of fact for a jury to decide. (It should be
noted that a nearly identical restriction in Skyland Broadcasting Corp.
v. Hamby and WAVI, Inc.45 was held valid. That action was brought by
the previous employer against the employee on the employee's violation
of the contract.)
Conclusion
It would appear that the statement that one may not interfere with
the contract rights of another unless legally justified applies equally to
the injured party's previous employer as well as to any other third party.
The peculiar relationship of employer-employee does, however, provide
41 Extine v. Williamson Midwest, Inc., supra note 38; Gates-McDonald Co. v. McQuil-

kin, supra note 39; Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland v. Witter, supra note
38.
42 140 Ohio St. 499, 45 N.E.2d 757 (1943).
43 Supra note 39.
44
45

Supra note 1.
2 Ohio Op.2d 426, 141 N.E.2d 783 (1957).
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unique opportunities for acts of interference and equally unique justifications (e.g., the right to fair and honest competition). The existence of
a contract of employment and a restrictive covenant contained therein
will, in certain situations, supply a justification for an otherwise tortious
act. Further, it is unnecessary to a right of action for interference with
a plaintiff's employment that a contract relationship have existed and
been disturbed. (See, for example, Owen v. Williams.46 ) Lastly, it
would appear that under no circumstances will an act of interference be
justified if the means employed were not reasonable in the circumstances.
Thus, no standard test can be drawn nor universal rule applied.
Each case must be weighed on its own merits to determine whether a
particular act constituted interference and whether that act was justified.
In any case this is a question of fact.
46 322 Mass. 356, 77 N.E.2d 318 (1948).
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